NOVOGODIŠNJA TORTA


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Pult: Bjelanjke istucite dok ne utrostruče volumen, zatim dodajte šećer i miješajte dok ne postane sjajna beze.

Utrljajte žumanjke sa uljem u tanki majonez, pa prelijte bjelanjke i lagano promiješajte drvenom kašikom.

Brašno, kakao i prašak za pecivo dodaju se na kraju kiše, uključujući sve sastojke, lagano miješajući.

Pripremite okrugli oblik koji prekrivamo papirom za pečenje i stavimo cijeli sastav gornjeg dijela koji smo 35 minuta stavili peći na pravu vatru.

sirup: Stavite vodu, šećer i esenciju ruma u čajnik, pustite da proključa.

Bela krema: Šlag dobro izmiksati dok se ne stvrdne, dodati med, mlijeko, zatim želatinu koja se koristi prema uputama. Na kraju dodamo esenciju vanilije i sve promiješamo. Pustite da se ohladi dok se kolač ne sjedini.

Crna krema: Pripremamo lonac za kuhanje koji stavljamo na pecivo. Lagano otopljenu čokoladu zajedno sa šlagom i maslacem stavimo u lonac i pustimo da se čokolada otopi, uz stalno miješanje. Kad dosegne tačku ključanja, skidamo je sa štednjaka i sačekajte da se ohladi.

Glaze: Pomiješajte sve sastojke u marini i ostavite da malo prokuha.

sklapanje:

Uzimamo vrh kolača i režemo ga na 3. Sirupiramo dno, dodamo dio bijele kreme, zatim tanku „traku“ crne kreme i pustimo da se malo ohladi. Zatim se vraćamo s drugim slojem bijele kreme i nastavite sa sljedećim dijelom pulta (2.), sirupom stavite, bijelom i crnom kremom, a zatim zadnji dio pulta i ukrasite glazurom, kremom i višnjama.

Vrlo visok i buuunnn kolač po ukusu!



Seksualno zlostavljanje

Trenutno stanje zastarelosti New Yorka u slučajevima seksualnog zlostavljanja sažeto je na Nacionalnoj konferenciji državnih zakonodavnih tijela kako slijedi:

“U New Yorku ne postoji produžena zastara za seksualno zlostavljanje, međutim, ako se zlostavljanje tretira kao namjerna delikta, njujorški SOL je godinu dana. N.Y. Civil Prac. Zakon § 215. Ako žrtva podnese tužbu protiv crkve ili škole koja je upravljala počiniteljem, ili bilo koju radnju koja se temelji na nemaru, a ne na kriminalnom ponašanju, SOL je 3 godine & # 8211 N.Y. Civil Prac. Zakon § 214. New York je usvojio posebnu zastaru za žrtve seksualnih zločina 2006. & # 8211 N.Y. Civil Prac. Zakon §213-c. Statut predviđa da se tužbe za građansku odštetu za definirane seksualne zločine, uključujući seksualno zlostavljanje maloljetnika, mogu pokrenuti u roku od 5 godina od djela koja predstavljaju seksualni zločin. ”

Predloženi zakon, poznat kao "Zakon o reformi seksualnog zlostavljanja djece", [A.01042 (Prestlow)] izmijenio bi CPLR dodavanjem odjeljka 213-d koji bi produžio SOL sa 3 na 6 godina u kojem će donijeti radnja u kojoj je tužilac onemogućen kao rezultat djetinjstva / ludila u vrijeme nastanka radnje. To bi također dodalo statut oživljavanja od 2 godine za svaku radnju koju je SOL prethodno zabranio. Dana 9. januara 2013. upućen je Odboru za kodekse. To je račun od jedne kuće, bez uporedivog zakona Senata. Drugi prijedlog zakona, A.04008 (Gabyszak), s više sponzora, predlaže dodavanje odjeljka 214-f CPLR-u, kojim bi se SOL produžio na 15 godina od početka akta, počevši od sadašnjeg perioda naplate putarine ili nakon izvještavanje o incidentu, ovisno o tome što je ranije. Ovaj prijedlog zakona uveden je na zakonodavnim sjednicama od 2003. do 2009. godine. Uveden je 30. januara 2013. godine i odnosio se na kodekse.


Upotrebe i zloupotrebe prekršajnog prava u doba COVID-19

Svi smo u hrabrom novom svijetu. Odštetni advokati, i tužioci i branioci, predviđaju navalu slučajeva. Neki od ovih slučajeva bit će nesporna primjena doktrine torta na nove okolnosti koje je stvorio COVID-19. Drugi slučajevi pomaknut će granice zakona o odštetnom pravu, koji za odgovornost zahtijeva trijadu prekršaja, uzročno -posljedičnu vezu i štetu. Konvencionalne tužbe zasigurno bi trebale slijediti njihov pravni tok, ali bi nekonvencionalne tužbe trebali odvratiti sudovi ili ih zaista zabraniti zakonom. Evo kratkog (i, što je važno, nepotpunog) sažetka:

NJUJORK, NY - 14. APRILA: Trgovina na malo ostaje zatvorena 14. aprila 2020. u okrugu New York u Brooklynu. [+] York City. Preko 2.100 maloprodajnih objekata širom zemlje najavilo je potpuno zatvaranje ove godine. New York City ostaje epicentar pandemije koronavirusa u Sjedinjenim Državama. (Fotografija Robert Nickelsberg / Getty Images)

Konvencionalna odela:

Takve tužbe već su podnesene protiv operatora brodova za krstarenje, staračkih domova i mjesta za zabavu. Ponekad, ali ne uvek, bit će lako uspostaviti nemar (na primjer, da je COVID javno objavljen ako je većina drugih u istoj industriji poduzela preventivne mjere koje optuženi nije poduzeo itd.). Ponekad, ali ne uvek, bit će lako uspostaviti uzročnost (na primjer, neki koji su zaraženi virusom bili su na vrlo zatvorenim lokacijama, poput staračkih domova ili kruzera, a s obzirom na naše znanje o razdobljima inkubacije, razumno je zaključiti da su na tom mjestu uhvatili koronavirus). Ponekad, ali ne uvek, bit će lako uspostaviti oštećenja (Lako je ako prethodno zdrava osoba dobije koronavirus i umre, nije tako lako ako tužitelj nikada nije razvio simptome, ali se tuži zbog "straha od koronavirusa".)

Tamo gdje postoji malo dokaza o nemaru (na primjer, gdje je tvornica stvorila društvenu separaciju i dezinficirala opremu nakon što je najavljena pandemija), okrivljenima se treba donijeti skraćena presuda. Čak i ako u datom slučaju postoji nemar, uzročno -posljedičnu vezu može biti teško dokazati: možda je pumpu za gorivo trebalo češće sanirati, ali kako gospodin Smith može dokazati da je vjerojatno obolio od koronavirusa na toj pumpi? Nasuprot tome, uzročnost se može lako dokazati (na primjer, zatvorenici s koronavirusom jasno su zarazili bolest u zatvorima), ali ne može postojati nemar (ako, na primjer, jednostavno nije bilo moguće upravljati zatvorom na bilo koji drugi način).

Ovo je namjerno oštećenje baterije. Rijetko su se događale takve baterije, ali su se događale. Baterije su i delikti i zločini. Ako se žrtva brzo testira i pozitivna je na koronavirus, može se zaključiti o uzročnosti.

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Recenzija knjige: Vrlo ugodan "Brat: priča iz 80 -ih" Andrewa McCarthyja

Nekonvencionalna odijela:

  • Moje preduzeće je zatvorila vlada, ili (oprezno) ja zbog pandemije, a vi ste odbili da mi platite uprkos osiguranju za prekid poslovanja koje sam sklopio sa vašom kompanijom.

Ako polica osiguranja za prekid poslovanja ne sadrži izuzeća za pandemije ili vanredne situacije koje je naredila vlada, to postaje prilično konvencionalno odijelo. Problem je u tome što osiguranje od prekida poslovanja obično isključuje pokriće za zarazne bolesti poput koronavirusa, a često ga isključuje i za izvanredna stanja vlade. [To je zato što se masovna oštećenja teško ponovno osiguravaju. Iz sličnih razloga osiguranje vlasnika kuća obično isključuje štetu od poplava, koja može utjecati na sve domove u određenom području.] Trenutno se vrši pritisak na savezne i državne vlade da prisile osiguravatelje da isplate odštetne zahtjeve bez obzira na jezik polise. Restoranska industrija, ograničena na usluge preuzimanja i dostave prema državnim zakonima, mogla bi izgubiti 225 milijardi dolara u prodaji u sljedeća tri mjeseca. Ko bi trebao platiti ovaj gubitak, vlasnici preduzeća ili vlada ili osiguravači? Koalicija poznatih kuhara (uključujući Wolfganga Pucka, Daniela Bouluda i Jean-Georgesa Vongerichtena) stvorila je Grupa za prekid poslovanja. BIG očito je lobirao kod predsjednika Trumpa da kazni osiguratelje ili ih možda subvencionira u isplati bez obzira na njihov ugovor. U svakom slučaju, ugostitelji su već podnijeli znatan broj tužbi.

Nacrt zakona koji se sastavlja u New Jerseyju mogao bi staviti određene osiguravatelje na udicu gubitka u prekidu poslovanja zbog izbijanja COVID-19, bez obzira na izuzeća koja mogu imati njihove police osiguranja. Takav zakon može imati ozbiljne ustavne nedostatke prema klauzuli o ugovorima, osim ako se ne primjenjuje samo na ugovore zaključene nakon usvajanja zakona.

  • Vi ili vaši proizvodi ste me loše spasili. Kancelarija vašeg ljekara ili vaša bolnica bila je mjesto gdje sam oboljela od koronavirusa. Alternativno, maska ​​ili rukavice koje ste proizveli nisu me zaštitile. Alternativno, vakcina protiv COVID-19 (nakon što se razvije) nije mi uspjela.

Pravni problemi s takvim tužbama su brojni. Uspostavljanje nemar bit će teško: šta su, prema predviđanju (unatrag 20/20), liječnik ili bolnica učinili pogrešno? Kako i po koju cijenu su maska ​​ili rukavice mogle biti učinjene "savršenima"? Uspostavljanje uzročnost bit će i teško: kako znamo da je žrtva uhvatila koronavirus u ordinaciji tog liječnika ili kada je koristila navodno poroznu masku? Teškoće takvih tužbi, u kombinaciji s nedostatkom „američkog pravila“ (koje tjera optužene koji su tuženi da plate svoje advokatske takse, čak i ako se utvrdi da nisu odgovorni, i zbog toga vodi optužene koji nisu učinili apsolutno ništa pogrešno riješiti) je vrlo dobar argument za usvajanje statuta imuniteta na COVID-19 u korist spasilaca i proizvođača cjepiva. Odgovornost bi trebala biti ograničena na (vrlo rijetke) slučajeve u kojima proizvodni nedostatak uzrokuje štetu (na primjer, ako je serija vakcine bila kontaminirana stranom tvari koja je proizvela "potpis" štete kod osoba koje primaju kontaminiranu seriju).

Liječnici koji propisuju lijekove, koje je FDA odobrila za drugu upotrebu, pacijentima s COVID-19 trebali bi na sličan način biti zaštićeni zakonom od odgovornosti ako ti lijekovi ne djeluju, sve dok je u njihovoj upotrebi podržana znanstvena literatura. „Recepti izvan oznake“, kako se nazivaju, toliko su česti da se gotovo svaki lijek u nekim slučajevima koristi izvan oznake. Bilo bi nemarno ne propisivati ​​hidroksiklorokin pacijentima s COVID-19 u mnogim slučajevima, na primjer.

Predsjednik Trump potpisao je 27. marta zakon H.R. 748, “Zakon o pomoći, pomoći i ekonomskoj sigurnosti u vezi s koronavirusom” (CARES Zakon). Ovaj zakon uključuje takozvani jezik "dobri Samarićanin" koji pruža saveznu zaštitu od odgovornosti dobrovoljnih zdravstvenih radnika tokom hitnog odgovora na COVID-19 (vidi odjeljak 3215). Mislim da je ovo dobrodošao razvoj događaja.

  • Depresivan sam zbog nezaposlenosti ili mi se penzijski fond smanjio zbog gašenja berze.

Ovi zabrinjavajući slučajevi često su oštećenja bez prekršaja. Vlade su nalagale zatvaranje mnogih industrija, a smatrali ste da je njihov izbor politike bio pravilan ili ne, to je sigurno bilo razumno. Slično, trgovci zasigurno imaju pravo zatvoriti i otpustiti zaposlenike ako nedovoljni prihodi dođu nakon pandemije. Ekonomska nevolja se najbolje rješava javno, kao što je čin CARES -a učinjen za one koji su direktno oštećeni. Indirektna ekonomska šteta (depresija smanjuje penzione prihode) obično se ne kompenzira u Tortu i najbolje se vidi kao rizik ulaganja i života. Psihološki stres, iako stvaran, također se ne kompenzira zbog poteškoća u odvajanju stvarne od oštećene štete. Ovaj „moralni rizik“ razlog je zašto Common Law Torts ne dopušta delikte iz nemarnog nanošenja emocionalnog stresa. Tamo gdje nema nemara ima još manje razloga za kompenzaciju.

Mogao bih nastaviti, ali mislim da sam sažeo glavne vrste tužbi koje je pokrenuo i koji će biti potaknut COVID-19. Ipak, nisam raspravljao o tužbi protiv Kine - ako je ta zemlja nemarno dopustila da se virus proširi u inozemstvu skrivajući ga od ostatka svijeta, njegova perfidnost vjerovatno je uzrok bilionima dolara stvarne štete. Kao što je moj kolega advokat Stephen Carter pokazao, suvereni imunitet štiti ovog masovnog krivca od odgovornosti (iako su donkihotski tužbeni zahtjevi već podneseni u SAD -u i Izraelu).


Zločin maloljetnika

Delikti:
Skup prava, obaveza i pravnih lijekova koji sudovi primjenjuju u parničnim postupcima radi pružanja olakšica osobama koje su pretrpjele štetu zbog nezakonitih radnji drugih. Lice koje pretrpi povredu ili pretrpi materijalnu štetu usljed nasilničkog ponašanja poznato je kao tužilac, a osoba koja je odgovorna za nanošenje povrede i snosi odgovornost za štetu poznata je kao tuženi ili deliktetor.
Tri elementa moraju biti uspostavljena u svakoj radnji delikta. Prvo, tužilac mora dokazati da je tuženi imao zakonsku obavezu da se ponaša na određeni način. Drugo, tužilac mora dokazati da je tuženi prekršio ovu dužnost tako što nije prilagodio svoje ponašanje. Treće, tužilac mora dokazati da je pretrpio povredu ili gubitak kao direktnu posljedicu povrede tuženog.
Zakon o prekršajima izveden je iz kombinacije načela običajnog prava i zakonodavnih akata. Za razliku od tužbi za kršenje ugovora, delikti ne zavise od sporazuma strana u parnici. Za razliku od krivičnih progona, koje pokreće vlada, tužbu protiv delikta podnose građani. Pravni lijekovi za krivična djela uključuju odštetu u novcu i sudske zabrane (sudski nalozi prisiljavaju ili zabranjuju određeno ponašanje). Delikti ne podležu ni novčanoj kazni ni zatvaranju na građanskom sudu.

Oboriva pretpostavka:
U zakonu o dokazima, pretpostavka koja se može pobiti ili osporiti ako se uvedu suprotni dokazi. Nakon toga teret dokazivanja prelazi na drugu stranu.

Vikarna odgovornost:
Uvođenje odgovornosti za delikte prema jednoj osobi (koja nije direktno odgovorna za povredu), za ponašanje druge osobe samo na osnovu odnosa između dvije osobe.

Odgovornost maloljetnika za vlastita delikta

Maloljetnik je odgovoran za svoja djela. Međutim, sud će često primjenjivati ​​blaži standard. U određivanju odgovornosti za delikte za djecu postoje posebna pravila, obično zasnovana na dobi maloljetnika. Istorijski gledano, postojao je svijetli test zasnovan na dobi djeteta. Konkretno:

  • Mlađi od 7 godina: Dijete ne može biti nemarno.
  • Između 7 i 14 godina: Postojala je opovrgnuta pretpostavka da dijete ne može biti nemarno.
  • Između 14 i 21 godine: Postojala je oboriva pretpostavka da je dijete sposobno za nemar.

PRIMJER: Ted je imao 6 godina kada se ozlijedio nakon trčanja ispred automobila. Vozač je tvrdio da je Ted bio zakonski nesavjestan. Niži sud je zaključio da dijete ne može biti nemarno zbog svojih godina. Međutim, u žalbenom postupku sud je odlučio da bi porota trebala odlučiti može li se, na osnovu činjenica i okolnosti ovog slučaja i karakteristika ovog djeteta, smatrati da je Ted bio nemaran. Vidi, npr. Tyler protiv Weeda, 280 N.W. 827 (Mich. 1938). Vidi takođe, Baker v, 132 N.W. 2d 614 (Mich. 1965).

Upotreba subjektivnog testa zamijenila je staru upotrebu hronološkog testa starosti. Ovaj test bavi se sposobnošću određenog djeteta da prepozna i izbjegne rizik i štetu. Čimbenici uzeti u obzir u ovoj analizi uključuju:

S obzirom na razliku u stopama razvoja djeteta, ovaj test može preciznije procijeniti djetetovu krivicu.

PRIMJER: Albert (12 godina) ranjen je metkom iz pištolja koji je ispalio njegov rođak George (12 godina), dok su se igrali u vikendici u vlasništvu njihovog zajedničkog djeda. U pokušaju da pobije tužbu protiv Alberta protiv Georgea i njegova djeda, George se oslanjao na svoje godine da se oslobodi bilo kakve krivice za svoje postupke. Da je hronološki test starosti bio primjenjiv, postojala bi pretpostavka da George nije mogao biti nemaran. Umjesto toga, apelacioni sud potvrdio je prvostepeni sud zaključkom da su George i njegov djed odgovorni za Albertove povrede. Sud je utvrdio da je George "bio dužan primjenjivati ​​razumnu brigu, koja se mjerila" razumnom brigom "koju bi druga maloljetna lica, poput starosti, iskustva, sposobnosti i razvoja, obično vršila pod sličnim okolnostima." EEA Kuhns protiv Bruggera, 135 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1957).

Standard se mijenja kada se maloljetnik uključi u aktivnosti odraslih, poput vožnje automobila ili letenja avionom. U tim slučajevima dijete se drži istog standarda kao i odrasla osoba.

PRIMJER: David, koji je imao 15 godina, poginuo je kada se motocikl kojim je upravljao sudario sa vozačevim automobilom. Na suđenju se vozač usprotivio maloljetnom standardu u kojem se navodi da je preminuli u trenutku nesreće imao manje od 21 godine, da se smatrao maloljetnim i da nije trebao biti pod istim nadzorom kao odrasla osoba. Umjesto toga, tvrdilo se da je od umrlog potrebno brinuti o prosječnom djetetu njegovih godina, iskustvu i stupnju mentalnog razvoja. Po tim uputama porote, porota je vratila presudu u korist administratora Davidove imovine. U žalbenom postupku sud je zaključio da je ispravan standard njege bio standard odrasle osobe jer je David (iako maloljetan) upravljao motornim vozilom. Vidi, npr. Daniels protiv Evansa, 224 A.2d 63 (N.H. 1966). Kao takav, u najmanju ruku David se mogao smatrati doprinosom nemarom u nesreći.

Roditeljska odgovornost za maloljetnike

Istraživanje različitih televizijskih emisija sudija otkrilo bi priličnu količinu tužbi protiv maloljetnika. Tužilac često pokušava da od roditelja naplati odštetu za mučno ponašanje maloletnog deteta. U određenim okolnostima, roditelji se mogu držati građanski ili krivično nemarni zbog ponašanja svoje malodobne djece.

Svaka država ima svoj zakon koji se odnosi na finansijsku odgovornost roditelja za djela njihove djece. Roditelji su odgovorni za štetna djela svoje djece na isti način na koji su poslodavci odgovorni za štetne postupke svojih zaposlenika. Ovaj pravni koncept poznat je kao namjenska odgovornost. Roditelj je namjerno odgovoran, iako nije direktno odgovoran za ozljedu. Određene države smatraju roditelje finansijski odgovornim za štetu koju je prouzrokovala njihova djeca. Neke od ovih država, međutim, postavljaju ograničenja na iznos odgovornosti. Na primjer, u Kaliforniji roditelji su građansko odgovorni za "maloljetna djela namjernog nedoličnog ponašanja koja su dovela do smrti, tjelesnih ozljeda ili materijalne štete". Vidi Cal. Civ. Kod § 1714.1 (2005). Konkretno,

Vidi Cal. Civ. Kod § 1714.1 (a) (2005).

PRIMJER: Andrew, koji ima 16 godina, popio je alkohol s nekim prijateljima (također maloljetnim). Dok je bio pijan, ukrao je mali avion i krenuo u veselu vožnju sa svojim prijateljima. Nije imao pilotsku dozvolu. Iako je uspio sletjeti u avion bez incidenata, kliznuo je u drugi mali avion i nanio štetu u iznosu od 10.000 dolara. Vlasnik oštećenog aviona tužio je Andrewa i njegove roditelje. Da se ovaj incident dogodio u Kaliforniji, i Andrew i njegovi roditelji mogli bi biti solidarno odgovorni za odštetu od 10.000 USD kao posljedicu Andrewinog namjernog prekršaja. Vidi Cal. Civ. Kod § 1714.1, vidi takođe Nev. Rev. State. Ann. § 41.470 (2005).

Druge vrste odgovornosti za delikte obuhvaćenije su u klasi delikta.

Odgovornost za zločine

U opštem pravu postojala su i razgraničenja prema starosti prema odgovornosti maloljetnika za kriminalno ponašanje:

  • Mlađi od 7 godina: Dijete se konačno smatralo nesposobnim za izvršenje krivičnog djela.
  • Između 7 i 14 godina: Postojala je pretpostavka da dijete nije u stanju stvoriti zločinačku namjeru, međutim, tu pretpostavku bi mogla opovrgnuti država dokazujući da je dijete imalo dovoljno inteligencije za formiranje zločinačke namjere.
  • Između 14 i 21 godine: Smatralo se da je maloljetnik imao istu sposobnost da formira kriminalnu namjeru kao i punoljetna osoba.

Danas se većina država bavi maloljetnim prestupnicima sa statutima koji se fokusiraju na nadzor i rehabilitaciju maloljetnika u parničnom postupku. Općenito, maloljetnici ostaju u nadležnosti sudova za mladež do 16. ili 18. godine, nakon čega podliježu istim krivičnim odgovornostima kao i odrasli. Ipak, kako mlađi počinitelji čine nasilne zločine, sistem krivičnog pravosuđa se bori s tim kako se nositi s tim situacijama.


Koja pasmina je moja torta?

zdravo, imamo Reggie već više od 3 godine, dobili smo je od porodičnog prijatelja koji se odselio. Imali smo je u ograđenom prostoru, ali ona se stalno grebala po njoj i uvijek se zaglavila pokušavajući je otvoriti! Trenutno živi na podu moje spavaće sobe, ovo je super kontroverzno što sam vidio, ali nije imala problema s grickanjem namještaja, udarcima nogama ili jedenjem stvari za koje nije namijenjena. Neka od ovdje objavljenih kućišta su nevjerojatna! -Ali osjećam se loše držeći je na malom prostoru.

Možete li mi dati neki uvid u svijet kornjača i utvrditi koja je vrsta kornjače? Nisam video takvu kao ona! Također, možete li mi dati neki savjet o tome kako se brinuti o njoj i pobrinuti se da živi svoj život punim plućima? Hvala ti

Poznati član

Pillowkale222

Novi član


oprostite ako sam je držao na pogrešan način- nisam prije provjeravao plastron- definitivno joj je potrebno kupanje

List za njegu pustinjske kornjače

List za njegu koji vam je @Tom povezao na drugoj temi najnoviji je i najprecizniji list za njegu pustinjskih kornjača.

Trener pasa

Za ljude koji su dalje u unutrašnjosti, u toplijim i suhim područjima, to se može učiniti zadovoljavajuće bez topline, ali čak i za njih, bolje je s toplinom.

Ako kontaktirate ljude od kojih ste dobili kornjaču, ili većinu ljudi koji imaju i drže odrasle osobe, oni će vam reći da će biti u redu bez vrućine. Po svoj prilici, kornjača će završiti s RI i na kraju će uginuti tako blizu obale. Radio sam na plaži Hermosa u trgovini za kućne ljubimce, a svake smo godine spašavali nekoliko bolesnih DT. Lijek je bio preseliti ih unutra u Whittier u kuću prijatelja.

RobinRae

Novi član

Za ljude koji su dalje u unutrašnjosti, u toplijim i suhim područjima, to se može učiniti zadovoljavajuće bez topline, ali čak i za njih, bolje je s toplinom.

Ako kontaktirate ljude od kojih ste dobili kornjaču, ili većinu ljudi koji imaju i drže odrasle osobe, oni će vam reći da će biti u redu bez vrućine. Po svoj prilici, kornjača će završiti s RI i na kraju će uginuti tako blizu obale. Radio sam na plaži Hermosa u trgovini za kućne ljubimce, a svake smo godine spašavali nekoliko bolesnih DT. Lijek je bio preseliti ih unutra u Whittier u kuću prijatelja.


Ograničena delikta vs. Potpuno odstupanje & # 8211 Izuzeci od ograničenog delikta u PA

U Pensilvaniji osiguravajuća društva nude punu ponudu kolač pokriće, koje daje pokrivenim pojedincima pravo da tuže sudu za potpunu štetu, i ograničen delikt pokriće koje ograničava mogućnost tužbe za bol i patnju.

Čak i ako je osoba povrijeđena u saobraćajnoj nesreći ograničenom deliktom na polisi osiguranja automobila u Pensilvaniji, postoje izuzeci od ograničene delikta koji i dalje dozvoljavaju oštećeniku da tuži za bol i patnju.

Prema Zakonu o odgovornosti motornih vozila u Pennsylvaniji, postoje izuzeci u kojima oštećena strana koja je izabrala ograničenu deliktu ili je osigurana policom ograničene delikta još uvijek može oporaviti bol i patnju kao da ima potpunu policu delikta. Ovi izuzeci se mogu pronaći po zakonu na 75 Pa. Cons. State. § 1705 (d), i uključuju sljedeće:

  1. Nesreću je izazvao pijani vozačOgraničeni delikt ne primjenjuje se ako je vozač koji je kriv za nesreću osuđen za vožnju pod utjecajem utjecaja (DUI) (DWI) ili prihvaća ubrzanu rehabilitacijsku dispoziciju ili (ARD program). Ključno je zapamtiti da osoba mora biti osuđena za DUI ili prihvatiti ARD (često se naziva i „program za prve prekršioce“).
  2. Nesreću je izazvao vozač koji nije osiguran. Prema zakonu Pensilvanije, ako vozač koji je izazvao nesreću nije bio osiguran, oštećena strana nije vezana ograničenim deliktom. Zakon kaže da se ograničeni delikt ne primjenjuje "kad god kriva osoba nije zadržala finansijsku odgovornost kako se zahtijeva" prema zakonu Pensilvanije. 75 Pa. Cons. State. § 1705 (d) (1) (iv). To znači da ako povrijeđena žrtva u saobraćajnoj nesreći ima neosigurano osiguranje za automobiliste ili UM osiguranje, može se podnijeti zahtjev protiv vašeg osiguravajućeg društva i nećete biti vezani ograničenom deliktom čak ni ako ste odabrali ograničenu deliktu za svoj automobil politike.
  3. Automobil registrovan u drugoj državi. Ako se osoba koja je izazvala nesreću upravljala vozilom registriranim u državi izvan Pennsylvanije, ne primjenjuje se ograničeni delikt. Budući da mnoge saobraćajne nesreće u oblasti Philadelphije često uzrokuju vozači sa automobilom registrovanim u New Jerseyju, New Yorku, Marylandu ili Delawareu, ovo je značajan izuzetak. Imajte na umu da se te kontrole ne nalaze tamo gdje je vozač, već gdje je automobil registriran. 75 Pa. Cons. State. § 1705 (d) (1) (i).
  4. Putnik na aKomercijalno vozilo ili motocikl. Ako je oštećena osoba bila putnik u taksiju, autobusu, Uberu, Lyftu, iznajmljenom vozilu, motociklu ili bilo kojoj drugoj vrsti vozila koja nije „privatno putničko vozilo“, oštećena strana ima pravo na potpunu pokrivenu štetu, čak i ako je odabrala ograničeni delikt prema vlastitoj politici. Privatno putničko vozilo ne uključuje vozilo koje je iznajmljeno drugima (kamion za iznajmljivanje ili automobil za iznajmljivanje), koje koristi javnost (poput Ubera, Lyfta ili taksi taksija) ili se uglavnom koristi u komercijalne svrhe (kamion s prikolicom za tegljače, autobus, javni kombi). 75 Pa. Cons. State. § 1705 (d) (3). Privatno putničko vozilo definirano je s četiri kotača, čime se vozačima / putnicima motocikla omogućuje izuzetak od ograničenog delikta.
  5. Pješak ili biciklist. Pješak ili biciklist koji je ozlijeđen automobilom nije vezan ograničenim deliktom, unatoč onome što su odabrali za svoju politiku prema automobilima. Dakle, ako ste vi ili voljena osoba prelazili ulicu ili se vozili biciklom, a na vas naletio automobil, nije važno što ste odabrali ograničenu deliktu prema vlastitoj automobilskoj politici.
  6. Ozljeda je uključivala "ozbiljne ozljede" prema zakonu. Zakon kaže da "osim ako pretrpljena ozljeda nije ozbiljna ozljeda, svaka osoba koja je vezana ograničenim deliktom bit će spriječena u održavanju tužbe za bilo koji ekonomski gubitak [bol i patnja]." Šta znači ozbiljna povreda? Zakonodavno tijelo Pennsylvanije definiralo je ozbiljne ozljede kao "ozljede koje su dovele do smrti, ozbiljnog oštećenja tjelesne funkcije ili trajnog unakazivanja". 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702. Međutim, sudovi u Pennsylvaniji su zaključili da su sve ozljede različite i da čak i ozljeda mekog tkiva može predstavljati "ozbiljnu ozljedu" ako je jasno dokumentirana i značajno narušava tjelesnu funkciju.

Prilikom utvrđivanja da li je utvrđeno umanjenje vrijednosti "ozbiljno", Sud mora uzeti u obzir sljedeće faktore: (1) opseg umanjenja (2) određena funkcija tijela oslabljena (3) koliko je to umanjenje trajalo (4) vrsta tretmana potrebna za ispravljanje oštećenja i (5) bilo koji drugi relevantan faktor. Sudovi u Pennsylvaniji su zaključili da se fokus ne stavlja samo na vrstu ozljede, već na to kako su ozljede utjecale na određenu funkciju tijela. Obično će biti potrebno medicinsko svjedočenje kako bi se dokazala ozbiljna ozljeda.

Neki primjeri slučajeva u kojima su sudovi smatrali da bi ozljeda mogla biti "ozbiljna" i na poroti je bilo da utvrdi pitanje je li ozljeda ozbiljna, uključuju:

  • Tužiteljica je nastavila da oseća bolove u vratu, leđima, nogama, zajedno sa glavoboljama, nije mogla da sedi ili stoji duže vreme i propustila je aktivnosti svoje dece. Cadena protiv Latch, 78 A.3d 636 (Pa. Super. 2013)
  • Tužitelj je dobio herniju diska i prošao je kurs fizikalne terapije, a njegova sposobnost spavanja, trčanja i pješačenja na velike udaljenosti, igre sa djetetom, vožnje planinskim biciklom i motociklom mu je oslabljena, iako je propustio samo 3 dana rada. Kelly protiv Ziolka, 734 A.2d 893 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)
  • Tužiteljica je pretrpela izbočeni disk, bol koji joj je zračio u nogu, imala je poteškoća s podizanjem teških predmeta i igrom sa svojom kćerkom, i nastavila je osjećati bol više od godinu dana. Furman protiv Shapira, 721 A.2d 1125 (Pa. Super. 1998).
  • Tužitelj koji je patio od sindroma hroničnog bola nije mogao bez boli obavljati mnoge fizičke aktivnosti, uključujući kućne poslove i rekreaciju, te je imao problema sa spavanjem.Robinson protiv Upole, 750 A.2d 339 (Pa. Super. 2000).

Iskusna advokatska kancelarija za saobraćajne nesreće poput advokatske firme Pearce zna kako dokazati da je vaša ozljeda bila „ozbiljna“ kako bi dosegla prag za prevladavanje ograničenog delikta. Pobrinut ćemo se da prođete dijagnostičko testiranje kao što je MRI ili rendgen kako biste provjerili postoji li prijelom ili hernija diska.

Također, ako ste dobili ožiljke, to ćemo dokumentirati sa vašim liječnikom. Takođe, vodit ćemo dnevnik o tome kako su vaše ozljede utjecale na vaš život, primjerice ne dopuštajući vam da se igrate sa svojim djetetom ili učestvujete u društvenim aktivnostima. Ako vas boli i imate simptome, bit će važno da nastavite liječiti ovaj dokument osiguravajućoj kući. Osiguravajućem društvu također ćemo pokazati kako je ozljeda utjecala na vaš posao, ili pokazuje da ste propustili znatno vrijeme s posla ili da imate ograničenja i ne možete obavljati svoj posao u potpunosti na način na koji ste to radili.

  1. Drugi izuzeci od ograničenog delikta. Drugi manje uobičajeni izuzeci koji se koriste za prevladavanje ograničenog prekršaja uključuju nesreće uzrokovane greškom u dizajnu, proizvodnji, popravku ili održavanju vozila. Na kraju, iznimka postoji ako je osoba koja je izazvala nesreću namjeravala ozlijediti sebe ili drugu osobu.

Odvjetničko društvo Pearce tu je da vam pomogne. Za procjenu vašeg slučaja važno je imati iskusnog advokata s ograničenom deliktom. Edith Pearce godinama je radila kao advokat u osiguravajućoj kući za automobile. Ona zna kako prevladati ograničenu odbranu od prekršaja ako činjenice vašeg slučaja zadovoljavaju jedan od izuzetaka. Imat će detaljan pregled vašeg slučaja automobilske nesreće i vaših papira o osiguranju. Pozovite našu firmu. Nudimo besplatne konsultacije - stoga ne riskirajte svoj slučaj nikome.

Provjerite šta je Kaitlin rekla o nama na Googleu:

Ovu advokatsku kancelariju preporučio bih svakome! Edith, William i Nicole čine sve što mogu za svoje klijente i pomažu im da dobiju pravdu koju zaslužuju. Bićete u odličnim rukama sa ovom firmom!


Pet ključnih pravila IRS -a o načinu oporezivanja sudskih sporova

Mnogi tužitelji pobjeđuju ili rješavaju tužbu i iznenađeni su što moraju platiti porez. Neki to ne shvaćaju sve do poreza sljedeće godine kada IRS -ovi obrasci 1099 stignu poštom. Malo poreznog planiranja, posebno prije nego što se nagodite, uvelike je odmaklo. To je sada još važnije s većim porezima na rješavanje sporova prema nedavno usvojenom zakonu o poreznoj reformi. Mnogi tužitelji su oporezovani i na troškove advokata, čak i ako njihov advokat oduzme 40%. In a $100,000 case, that means paying tax on $100,000, even if $40,000 goes to the lawyer. The new law generally does not impact physical injury cases with no punitive damages. It also should not impact plaintiffs suing their employers, although there are new wrinkles in sexual harassment cases. Here are five rules to know.

1. Taxes depend on the “origin of the claim.” Taxes are based on the origin of your claim. If you get laid off at work and sue seeking wages, you’ll be taxed as wages, and probably some pay on a Form 1099 for emotional distress. But if you sue for damage to your condo by a negligent building contractor, your damages may not be income. You may be able to treat the recovery as a reduction in your purchase price of the condo. The rules are full of exceptions and nuances, so be careful, how settlement awards are taxed, especially post-tax reform.

2. Recoveries for physical injuries and physical sickness are tax-free, but symptoms of emotional distress are not physical. If you sue for physical injuries, damages are tax-free. Before 1996, all “personal” damages were tax-free, so emotional distress and defamation produced tax-free recoveries. But since 1996, your injury must be “physical.” If you sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress, your recovery is taxed. Physical symptoms of emotional distress (like headaches and stomachaches) is taxed, but physical injuries or sickness is not. The rules can make some tax cases chicken or egg, with many judgment calls. If in an employment dispute you receive $50,000 extra because your employer gave you an ulcer, is an ulcer physical, or merely a symptom of emotional distress? Many plaintiffs take aggressive positions on their tax returns, but that can be a losing battle if the defendant issues an IRS Form 1099 for the entire settlement. Haggling over tax details before you sign and settle is best.

3. Allocating damages can save taxes . Most legal disputes involve multiple issues. You might claim that the defendant kept your laptop, frittered away your trust fund, underpaid you, failed to reimburse you for a business trip, or other items. Even if your dispute relates to one course of conduct, there’s a good chance the total settlement involves several types of consideration. It is best for plaintiff and defendant to agree on tax treatment. Such agreements aren’t binding on the IRS or the courts in later tax disputes, but they are usually not ignored by the IRS.

4. Attorney fees are a tax trap. If you are the plaintiff and use a contingent fee lawyer, you’ll usually be treated (for tax purposes) as receiving 100% of the money recovered by you and your attorney, even if the defendant pays your lawyer directly his contingent fee cut. If your case is fully nontaxable (say an auto accident in which you’re injured), that shouldn't cause any tax problems. But if your recovery is taxable, watch out. Say you settle a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress against your neighbor for $100,000, and your lawyer keeps $40,000. You might think you’d have $60,000 of income. Instead, you’ll have $100,000 of income. In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Commissioner v. Banks, that plaintiffs generally have income equal to 100% of their recoveries. even if their lawyers take a share.

How about deducting the legal fees? In 2004, Congress enacted an above the line deduction for legal fees in employment claims and certain whistleblower claims. That deduction still remains, but outside these two areas, there's big trouble. in the big tax bill passed at the end of 2017, there's a new tax on litigation settlements, no deduction for legal fees. No tax deduction for legal fees comes as a bizarre and unpleasant surprise. Tax advice early, before the case settles and the settlement agreement is signed, is essential.

5. Punitive damages and interest are always taxable. If you are injured in a car crash and get $50,000 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages, the former is tax-free. The $5 million is fully taxable, and you can have trouble deducting your attorney fees! The same occurs with interest. You might receive a tax-free settlement or judgment, but pre-judgment or post-judgment interest is always taxable (and can produce attorney fee problems). That can make it attractive to settle your case rather than have it go to judgment. For a crazy example how these tax rules can whittle after-tax amounts to nothing, check out how IRS taxes kill plaintiff's $289M Monsanto weedkiller verdict.


Contents

At the time of the 1928 New York Court of Appeals decision in Palsgraf, that state's case law followed a classical formation for negligence: the plaintiff had to show that the Long Island Railroad [a] ("LIRR" or "the railroad") had a duty of care, and that she was injured through a breach of that duty. It was not required that she show that the duty owed was to her. [1] Under New York precedent, the usual duty of utmost care that the railroad as a common carrier owed its customers did not apply to platforms and other parts of the station. [1]

Facts Edit

Sunday, August 24, 1924, was a warm summer day in Brooklyn, and Helen Palsgraf, a 40-year-old janitor and housekeeper, was taking her two daughters, Elizabeth and Lillian, aged 15 and 12, to Rockaway Beach. Having paid the necessary fare, they were on the platform at the East New York station of the LIRR on Atlantic Avenue in Brooklyn, when a train, not theirs, pulled in. As it began to move again, two men raced for the train, and one made it without incident, as the doors had not closed. The other, a man carrying a package, leapt aboard, with the help of a platform guard pushing him from behind as a member of the train's crew pulled him into the car. But in the process, the man lost the package, which dropped and exploded, for it apparently contained fireworks. Either the force of the explosion or the panicking of those on the platform caused a tall, coin-operated scale to topple onto Helen Palsgraf. No one was hurt enough to spend the night in the hospital, though several people, Palsgraf among them, were listed as injured. [2] [3]

Contemporary accounts and witnesses at trial described the man as Italian in appearance, and there was speculation that the package was being taken for use at an Italian-American celebration of some sort no great effort was made to identify the owner. Palsgraf's injury was listed in The New York Times as shock she also suffered bruising. The distance between Helen Palsgraf and the explosion was never made clear in the trial transcript, or in the opinions of the judges who ruled on the case, but the distance from the explosion to the scale was described in the Times as "more than ten feet away" (3 metres). [2] [3] Several days after the incident, she developed a bad stammer, and her doctor testified at trial that it was due to the trauma of the events at East New York station. She had not recovered from the stammer when the case came to court. [4]

Trial Edit

Palsgraf brought suit against the railroad in the Supreme Court of New York, Kings County, a trial-level court, in Brooklyn on October 2, 1924. The summons was served the following month, and the defendant filed its answer on December 3. The case was heard on May 24 and 25, 1927, with Justice Burt Jay Humphrey presiding. [5] Humphrey had served for over twenty years on the county court in Queens before unexpectedly being nominated for election to the Supreme Court in 1925 he was noted for his courteous and friendly manner. [6] Manhattan lawyers tried the Brooklyn case: Matthew W. Wood, who worked from 233 Broadway (the Woolworth Building) represented Palsgraf, while Joseph F. Keany, whose office was at Pennsylvania Station, was for the railroad, along with William McNamara. [5] Wood was an experienced solo practitioner with two degrees from Ivy League schools Keany had headed the LIRR's legal department for twenty years—McNamara, who tried the case, was one of the department's junior lawyers, who had advanced from clerk to counsel after graduation from law school. [7] At trial, Palsgraf testified that she had been hit in the side by the scale, and had been treated at the scene, and then took a taxicab home. She testified to trembling then for several days, and then the stammering started. Her health forced her to give up her work in mid-1926. [8] Wood called Herbert Gerhardt, an engraver, who had seen the man with the package hurry towards the train, and whose wife had been hit in the stomach in the man's rush. He testified that the scale had been "blown right to pieces". [9]

On the second day of the trial, Wood called Dr. Karl A. Parshall, Palsgraf's physician. He testified that he had treated Palsgraf occasionally for minor ailments before the incident at East New York, but on the day after found her shaken and bruised. He gave it as his opinion that Palsgraf's ills were caused by the accident. [10] Grace Gerhardt, Herbert's wife, was the next witness. She testified to being hit by one of "the two young Italian fellows" who were racing to make the train, and how one made it unaided and the other only with the help of two LIRR employees. She had nothing to say about the scale or Palsgraf, having seen neither. [11] Elizabeth and Lillian Palsgraf, the elder and younger daughter of the plaintiff, were next to testify and spoke of what they had seen. Wood indicated his only remaining witness was a neurologist, an expert witness, and McNamara for the LIRR moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Palsgraf had failed to present evidence of negligence, but Justice Humphrey denied it. The neurologist, Graeme M. Hammond of Manhattan, had examined Palsgraf two days before, observing her stammering, speaking only with difficulty. She told him of depression and headaches. He diagnosed her with traumatic hysteria, for which the explosion was a plausible cause, and said the hysteria was likely to continue as long as the litigation did, for only once it was resolved were the worries connected with it likely to vanish. [12]

Wood rested his case on behalf of the plaintiff McNamara offered no evidence but again moved to dismiss, which Humphrey denied. The judge told the all-male jury that if the LIRR employees "omitted to do the things which prudent and careful trainmen do for the safety of those who are boarding their trains, as well as the safety of those who are standing upon the platform waiting for other trains, and that the failure resulted in the plaintiff's injury, then the defendant would be liable." [13] The jury was out for two hours and 35 minutes, including the lunch hour, and they awarded Palsgraf $6,000 ($89,400 today). [14] Pursuant to statute, she also recovered costs of $142, an amount added to the verdict. [15] A motion for a new trial was denied on May 27, 1927 by Justice Humphrey, who did not issue a written opinion, and a judgment was entered on the verdict on May 31, from which the LIRR appealed on June 14. [16] Once Palsgraf had gotten her jury verdict, the Gerhardts also sued the railroad, with Wood as their counsel. [17]

William H. Manz, in his article on the facts in Palsgraf, suggested that neither side spent much time preparing for trial. Wood did not contact his fact witnesses, the Gerhardts, until shortly before the trial, and Palsgraf was examined by Dr. Hammond the day before the trial started. McNamara, one of the most junior members of the LIRR's legal team, called no witnesses, and Manz suggested the entire defense strategy was to get the judge to dismiss the case. [18] In his later book, Judge Richard Posner indicated that the much-sued LIRR did not present a better case than the first-time plaintiff: "it put on a bargain-basement defense".

Initial appeal Edit

The LIRR's appeal took the case to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, for the Second Department, [19] the state's intermediate appeals court. In its briefs before the Appellate Division, the LIRR argued that the verdict had been contrary to the law and the evidence. It stressed that it had no foreknowledge that the package was dangerous, and that no law required it to search the contents of passenger luggage. The brief stated that given this, there was no negligence in helping a man make a train, and even if there was, that negligence was not the proximate cause of Palsgraf's injuries. [20] Wood, for Palsgraf, argued that the jury verdict finding negligence was supported by undisputed facts, and should not be questioned by the appellate courts. The plaintiff's brief also suggested that the failure of the railroad to call as witnesses the employees who had aided the man should decide any inferences of negligence against it. Wood deemed the trainmen guilty of a "dereliction of duty", misconduct that was the proximate cause of Palsgraf's injuries. [21]

The lawyers argued the case before the Appellate Division in Brooklyn on October 21, 1927. [15] On December 9, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's judgment, 3–2. Albert H. F. Seeger wrote the majority opinion for the five justices hearing the case, and was joined by Justices William F. Hagarty and William B. Carswell. [19] Seeger had been born in Stuttgart and came to the United States as a child he had been elected to the Supreme Court in 1917 and was elevated to the Appellate Division by Governor Al Smith in 1926. Aged 68 at the time of Palsgraf, he could serve only two more years before mandatory retirement. [22] Justice Seeger ruled that the finding of negligence by the jury was supported by the evidence, and speculated that the jury might have found that helping a passenger board a moving train was a negligent act. He wrote that while the set of facts might be novel, the case was no different in principle from well-known court decisions on causation, such as the Squib case, in which an explosive (a squib) was lit and thrown, then was hurled away repeatedly by people not wanting to be hurt until it exploded near the plaintiff, injuring him his suit against the man who had set the squib in motion was upheld. The majority also focused on the high degree of duty of care that the LIRR owed to Palsgraf, one of its customers. [23]

Presiding Justice Edward Lazansky (joined by Justice J. Addison Young) wrote a dissent. [19] Lazansky, the son of Czech immigrants, had been elected New York Secretary of State as a Democrat in 1910. Elected to the Supreme Court in 1917, he had been designated presiding justice of the Second Department by Governor Smith earlier in 1927. [22] Lazansky did not question the jury finding of negligence, but felt that the employees' conduct was not the proximate cause of Palsgraf's injuries, since the man's conduct in bringing a package that might explode to a crowded passenger station was an independent act of negligence, rendering the neglect by the railroad too remote in causation for there to be liability. [24]

The LIRR was entitled by law to take the case to the New York Court of Appeals (the state's highest court) as there had been a dissent in the Appellate Division, and it did. [25] The railroad argued again that Palsgraf had failed to establish that she had come to harm through the railroad's negligence: that there was no negligence, and even if there was, that neglect had not harmed Palsgraf, since such injury was not "a natural and probable consequence of assisting a man to board a train". [20] Its brief alleged that the trainmen could not have stopped the man from boarding, and once he had flung himself onto the train, had little choice but to help him, "faced with such an emergency they cannot be charged with negligence because they elected to assist the man rather than stand idly by and leave him to his fate." [26] Wood, for his part, argued that negligence had been found by the jury, and by both majority and dissenting justices in the Appellate Division. He wrote that there were many facts from which the jury could have found negligence, including the fact that the train had not shut its doors as it departed (though whether this was to allow latecomers to board or because it was a summer day is uncertain). [27] The case was argued before the Court of Appeals in Albany on February 24, 1928. [28]

Cardozo's majority opinion Edit

Cardozo's statement of facts, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. at 340–341

The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, Benjamin N. Cardozo, was a judge who was greatly respected he later became a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. After a standout legal career, Cardozo had been elected to the trial-level Supreme Court in 1913, but was quickly designated by the governor for service on the Court of Appeals. He was in 1917 appointed a judge of that court, and in 1926 was elected chief judge by the voters. [29] In Palsgraf, Cardozo wrote for a 4–3 majority of the Court of Appeals, reversing the appellate judgment and directing that the case be decided for the defendant, the LIRR. [30] Cardozo was joined by Judges Cuthbert W. Pound, Irving Lehman and Henry Kellogg. [31]

Despite being the longest statement of the facts in any of the four appellate opinions generated by the case, [32] Cardozo's was described by Posner as "elliptical and slanted". [33] It has also been deemed "highly abstract". [32] According to Professor Walter O. Weyrauch in his 1978 journal article, "Cardozo's famous opinion reduced the complicated facts of the case to a bare minimum. Mrs. Palsgraf was transformed into a 'plaintiff' without age, family status, or occupation. The opinion omitted the nature of her injury, the amount of damages that she sought, and the size of the jury award." [34] For example, Cardozo describes Palsgraf (whom he does not name, nor mention her daughters) as standing on the LIRR's platform, rather than waiting for a train, thus downplaying her status as a customer entitled to a high degree of care by the railroad. The explosive package is described as small, though the witnesses had described it as large. The scales are described as being "at the other end of the platform, many feet away" from the explosion, but the record does not support this statement. [35] This characterization may have been based on testimony by Lillian Palsgraf, who had gone to buy a paper from a newsstand "at the other end of the platform", but who was yet close enough to see the package fall. Cardozo's characterization of distance would be challenged by the plaintiff in her motion for reargument, which would be denied with the rejoinder that however close she was to the explosion, she was not so close as to bring her within the zone of foreseeable risk. [36]

After the fact pattern, Cardozo began his discussion of the law with "the conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Relative to her it was not negligence at all." [37] Cardozo quoted Pollock on Torts and cited several cases for the proposition that "proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do." [37] Only if there is a duty to the injured plaintiff, the breach of which causes injury, can there be liability. [38] He defended his decision, "a different conclusion will involve us, and swiftly too, in a maze of contradictions." [37] Cardozo posed hypothetical situations: if a railway guard stumbles over a bundle of newspapers, and there are explosives within, will there be liability to an injured passenger at the other end of the platform? Will the result be different if the object containing the explosives is a valise instead? If there was negligence that day, Cardozo argued, it was only negligence that resulted in the fall and destruction of the package, and there was no wrong done by the railroad to Palsgraf for personal injury, "the diversity of incidents emphasizes the futility of the effort to build the plaintiff's right upon the basis of a wrong to some one else." [39] The chief judge instructed, "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed". [40] Cardozo did not absolve the defendant who knowingly unleashes a destructive force, such as by shooting a gun, just because the bullet takes an unexpected path. This is not such a case, Cardozo held: even if the railway guard had thrown down the package intentionally, without knowing the contents he could not knowingly risk harm to Palsgraf, and would not be liable. Negligence cannot impose liability where an intentional act would not. [41]

Negligence, Cardozo emphasized, derives from human relations, not in the abstract. Negligence that does no one harm is not a tort. It is not enough, he found, to prove negligence by the defendant and damage to the plaintiff there must be a breach of duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant. He traced the history of the law of negligence, a concept not known in medieval times, and noted that it evolved as an offshoot of the law of trespass, and one could not sue for trespass to another. Had the railroad been negligent towards Palsgraf, it might have been liable, but "the consequences to be followed must first be rooted in a wrong", and there was no legal wrong done by the railroad to Palsgraf. [42] Thus, the lower courts were incorrect, and must be reversed, and the case dismissed, with Palsgraf to bear the costs of suit. [43]

Dissent by Andrews Edit

William S. Andrews of Syracuse was a 69-year-old [44] judge, noted for his scholarship, who had been on the Court of Appeals since 1917. The son of Charles Andrews, a former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, William Andrews is best remembered today because he wrote an opinion in Palsgraf. [45] In that dissent, he was joined by Judges Frederick E. Crane and John F. O'Brien. Andrews began with a brief recitation of facts: that a railroad employee had negligently dislodged the package, the contents of which the trainman was unaware, and the subsequent explosion broke the scale and injured the plaintiff, "an intending passenger". [46] Andrews noted the fundamental difference among the judges concerning the law of negligence: whether there must be a duty to the plaintiff, the breach of which injured her, and whether, when there is an act that is a threat to the safety of others, the doer of it should be "liable for all its proximate consequences, even where they result in injury to one who would generally be thought to be outside the radius of danger". [46] Andrews believed that if there was a negligent act, the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff, that should establish liability. [47]

Andrews found Cardozo's reasoning too narrow, and felt that the focus should be on the unreasonable act: driving down Broadway at high speed is negligent whether or not an accident occurs. Such an act is wrong to the public at large, not only to those who might be injured. "Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B or C alone . In an empty world, negligence would not exist. It does involve a relationship between man and his fellows. But not merely a relationship between man and those whom he might reasonably expect his act would injure. Rather, a relationship between him and those whom he does in fact injure. If his act has a tendency to harm some one, it harms him a mile away as surely as it does those on the scene." [48]

Andrews pointed out that the law allows plaintiffs to recover from defendants who had no duty towards them: orphans may recover for their negligently killed parents a bereaved person may recover for negligence in the death of a spouse. An insurance company may sue in subrogation and recover the sum paid out from the person who started the fire. "Behind the cloud of words is the fact they hide, that the act, wrongful as to the insured, has also harmed the company." [49]

An event may have many causes, Andrews noted, and only some may be deemed proximate. Liability for negligence may only be found where that proximate cause exists, a term that the judge admitted was inexact. He suggested the analogy of a river, made up of water from many sources, and by the time it wound to sea, fully intermixed. But for a time, after water from a muddy swamp or a clayey bed joins, its origin may be traced. Beyond a certain point, it cannot be traced, and such is proximate cause, "because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics." [50]

That point, beyond which there is no proximate cause, is drawn differently by different judges, and by different courts, Andrews explained. He listed factors that courts might consider, such as remoteness in time or space, and discussed some hypotheticals, such as a chauffeur who causes an accident, the noise of which startles a nursemaid into dropping a child, then returned to the case being decided,

Mrs. Palsgraf was standing some distance away. How far cannot be told from the record—apparently twenty-five or thirty feet. Perhaps less. Except for the explosion, she would not have been injured. We are told by the appellant in his brief "it cannot be denied that the explosion was the direct cause of the plaintiff's injuries." So it was a substantial factor in producing the result—there was here a natural and continuous sequence—direct connection. The only intervening cause was that instead of blowing her to the ground the concussion smashed the weighing machine which in turn fell upon her. There was no remoteness in time, little in space. And surely, given such an explosion as here it needed no great foresight to predict that the natural result would be to injure one on the platform at no greater distance from its scene than was the plaintiff. Just how no one might be able to predict. Whether by flying fragments, by broken glass, by wreckage of machines or structures no one could say. But injury in some form was most probable. [51]

Given that, Andrews concluded, the jury verdict should be upheld. "Under these circumstances I cannot say as a matter of law that the plaintiff's injuries were not the proximate result of the negligence. That is all we have before us." [51]

Wood, Palsgraf's lawyer, moved the Court of Appeals to allow reargument of the case, alleging that Cardozo had confused the position of Palsgraf with that of her daughter Lillian (at the newsstand), and complained about the chief judge's use of such terms as "distant" and "far away". Wood warned that the decision could have far-reaching adverse effects on innocent passengers. [52] The court denied the motion with a one-sentence statement likely written by Cardozo, "If we assume that the plaintiff was nearer the scene of the explosion than the prevailing opinion would suggest, she was not so near that injury from a falling package, not known to contain explosives, would be within the range of reasonable prevision." [36] Costs of $559.60 were due from Palsgraf to the railroad under Cardozo's order. [53] Posner doubted the sum was ever collected, noting that Palsgraf's family spoke to legal scholars and periodicals about the case in later years, and never mentioned an attempt to collect what would have been about a year's salary for the disabled former janitor. [54]

Helen Palsgraf remained embittered about the loss of her case. She became mute, and suffered from other health problems prior to her death on October 27, 1945, at the age of 61. At the time of her death, Palsgraf was living in Richmond Hill, Queens with her daughter Elizabeth. Her former attorney, Wood, maintained a law office in the Woolworth Building until his death in 1972 at age 96. His opposing trial counsel, McNamara, remained with the LIRR's legal department until his retirement in 1959, while McNamara's superior and counsel of record, Keany, continued as the railroad's general solicitor until he died in 1935. Justice Humphrey retired in 1936, a year after he gained notoriety for presiding over the marriage of heiress Doris Duke he died in 1940. [55] Andrews retired at the end of 1928, having reached the mandatory retirement age of 70 he died in 1936. [56] Cardozo was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1932 by President Herbert Hoover and served there until his death in 1938. [29]

After the Palsgraf case became prominent among lawyers, having been taught to many of them in law school, members of the family sometimes encountered startled reactions when lawyers learned their last name. Frank Palsgraf, Helen's grandson, told in 1978 of "being treated like a celebrity" by a prosecutor when called for jury duty, and causing the judge to reminisce about hard nights studying the case in law school. Nevertheless, the prosecutor struck him from the jury. [57] According to Posner, the later coverage of the family "makes it clear that, with the exception of Mrs. Palsgraf, the Palsgraf family was thrilled by its association with a famous case, notwithstanding the outcome". [58] In 1991, that association became closer, as Lisa Newell, first cousin four times removed of Judge Cardozo, married Palsgraf's great-grandson, J. Scott Garvey. [59]

Palsgraf came to the attention of the legal world quickly. William L. Prosser of the University of California Law School wrote that the Appellate Division's decision fell into the hands of Francis H. Bohlen of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Bohlen was at that time the reporter compiling the first Restatement of Torts for the American Law Institute (ALI), and Cardozo was informally one of the advisers. In that task, Bohlen was having difficulty dealing with the concept of duty of care in negligence, especially involving unforeseeable plaintiffs, and Prosser related that Cardozo was treated to a learned discussion by the other advisers of a case that might come before his court and, convinced by the arguments, used them to decide Palsgraf. [60] Kaufman doubted this story, which was told to Prosser by Dean Young B. Smith of Columbia, noting that the only meeting of the advisers between the two appeal decisions in Palsgraf took place in New York on December 12–13, 1927, beginning only three days after the Appellate Division ruled, and the notes reveal that Cardozo was absent the chief judge was hearing arguments all that week in Albany. Nevertheless, the discussions and materials from the Restatement compilation likely influenced Cardozo in his decision. [61]

Bohlen dwelt heavily upon Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf in presenting the Tentative Draft of the Restatement to the ALI's annual meeting, which approved the section citing Palsgraf with little discussion. [62] [b] Palsgraf quickly became well known in the legal community, and was cited in many cases, some of dubious relevance. According to Kaufman, "the bizarre facts, Cardozo's spin on the legal issue, the case's timing in relation to the Restatement project, its adaptability for law-school teaching, the policy-oriented dissent by Andrews, Cardozo's rhetoric, and Cardozo's name—all these factors combined to make Palsgraf a legal landmark." [59] According to Prosser, writing in his hornbook for law students, "what the Palsgraf case actually did was submit to the nation's most excellent state court a law professor's dream of an examination question". [63] But Professor (later Judge) John T. Noonan saw more than this, noting that Cardozo was then the nation's most prominent state-court judge: "The excitement of Palsgraf was not merely that it was a brilliant examination question it was an examination question answered by Cardozo." [63]

The first mentions of Palsgraf in law reviews were case notes written by law students, appearing over the course of the year following the decision by the Court of Appeals. Professor Robert L. Goodhart, in the Yale Law Journal in 1930, was at the front of an avalanche of commentary to such an extent that by 1938, Louisiana State University professor Thomas A. Cowan deemed Palsgraf "a legal institution". [64] The case entered the standard legal casebooks, from which law students learn, in the early 1930s, usually to illustrate the necessary connection between defendant's misconduct and plaintiff's injury in negligence cases. [65] According to Posner, writing in 1990, "Palsgraf is now the subject of a large scholarly literature, and is, I believe, the only case reprinted in all American casebooks on tort law." [66] Manz wrote, "everyone who has sat in an American law school torts class can recall the basic facts—the crowded railroad platform, the running men, the dropped package, the explosion, and the falling scale. Palsgraf has become a sort of legal 'urban legend'—an allegedly true, but improbable, tale told and retold to each new class of law students." [67] Professor W. Jonathan Cardi noted, "in law school classrooms, 'Palsgraf Day' is often celebrated with food and drink, dramatic reenactments, interpretive poems, and even mock duels between Judges Cardozo and Andrews". [68]

Palsgraf was soon adopted by some state courts, at times in different contexts: Though some state courts outside New York approved it, others did not, sometimes feeling that foreseeability was an issue for the jury to consider. [69] According to Posner, writing in 1990, Cardozo's holding that there is no liability to a plaintiff who could not have been foreseen "has been followed by a number of states besides New York, but it remains the minority rule. Most states continue to muddle along with the nebulous 'proximate cause' approach, which emphasizes the proximity in time and space of the defendant's careless act to the plaintiff's injury that was the approach taken by Judge Andrews's dissent in Palsgraf." [70]

The overwhelming majority of state courts accept that there must be a duty of care for there to be liability: the courts of Wisconsin, though, have stated that they have adopted Andrews' approach, and impose liability when there was a duty to any person, whether or not that person is the plaintiff. [71] The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) amended the earlier formulation only slightly, but the third Restatement (2009), takes an approach closer to that of Andrews in focusing on whether the defendant engaged in an activity that carried a risk of harm to another (not necessarily the plaintiff), and on whether the defendant exercised reasonable care. The new formulation makes foreseeability, or the scope of the risk, not a hurdle that must be overcome, as in Palsgraf, but a factor to be weighed with others when determining whether there was negligence. [72] [73] Thus, according to law professor David Owen in his 2009 article, "the Restatement (Third) discards Judge Cardozo's elemental work in Palsgraf so long ago. And . also rejects Judge Andrew's [sic] valuable insight that juries should be offered a wide range of fairness factors, beginning with foreseeability, in figuring how far responsibility should extend". [74]

According to Posner, "Cardozo's 'bottom line' is that there is no liability to an unforeseeable plaintiff". [70] Don Herzog, in his 2017 book, deemed the Palsgraf principle to mean that "if anyone was wronged here, it was the man with the parcel. The guards' wronging him happened to harm Mrs. Palsgraf. But that doesn't mean they wronged Mrs. Palsgraf. And if they didn't wrong her, she can't conceivably prevail in a tort action. Cardozo is not thinking that if he were on the jury, he wouldn't find the railroad liable. He is saying it was a legal error to let the jury finding stand." [75] This is because "the crucial fact for Cardozo is that the parcel of explosives was unmarked. So reasonably careful conductors worry only that if they make it fall, it will break . They have no reason to worry about the welfare of Mrs. Palsgraf." [76]

Cardozo has been praised for his style of writing in Palsgraf. Posner noted that in the facts of the case Cardozo "saw instantiated the basic principles of negligence law and was able to articulate them in prose of striking freshness, clarity, and vividness", in an opinion mostly written in short sentences and lacking footnotes or block quotes. [77] University of Pennsylvania Law School Professor Kim Lane Scheppele noted that the opinion was "written by Judge Benjamin Cardozo at the height of his formidable powers". [78] Richard Polenberg, in his study of that jurist, stated, "Cardozo had a genius for making it seem that the results he reached were logical, inevitable, and legally unassailable". [79] Prosser stated, "with due respect to the superlative style in which both [Cardozo's and Andrews' opinions] are written, neither of them wears well on long acquaintance. Both of them beg the question shamelessly, stating dogmatic propositions without reason or explanation." [80] Herzog was also less enthusiastic, noting that "the majority opinion is unfortunately written in the curious idiolect I sometimes call Cardozo-speak." [76]

From its early days, there has been criticism of Palsgraf, and more recently, of Cardozo for authoring it. Cowan, writing in 1938, described its holding as limited to its facts, that given the identical circumstances recurring, the railroad would breach no duty to the new plaintiff by assisting a man with such a package in boarding. [81] Prosser in his 1953 article wondered "how can any rule as to the 'scope of the risk' evolved from two guards, a package of fireworks and a scale aid in the slightest degree in the solution of this question? Is it proper, in Palsgraf itself, so utterly to ignore the fact that the plaintiff was a passenger[?] . until the question is decided, is Palsgraf really definite authority even for Palsgraf ?" [82]

Noonan's 1976 book chronicled the unwillingness by legal scholars to utilize the "multitude of legal facts not mentioned by Cardozo and Andrews", even though the lower-court record in Palsgraf was reproduced in a civil procedure casebook in the 1950s. [83] Noonan criticized Cardozo for not taking Palsgraf's circumstances into account when making his decision, and listed factors that may have influenced Cardozo against the plaintiff, including that he was a lifelong bachelor who did not have Palsgraf's experience of caring for children, and he may have frowned upon Wood's representation of Palsgraf (likely on a contingent fee, something not favored at the time). [84] Posner, writing in 1990, disagreed with Noonan and with feminist critics following him, noting that judges take an oath to do equal justice to rich and poor, "so the fact that Mrs. Palsgraf was poor would not have been a principled ground for bending the rules in her favor". [85] Noonan had considered unjust the award of court costs against Palsgraf, and in her 2016 book, law professor Cathleen Kaveny agreed, "the penalty imposed on Palsgraf for seeking justice through the courts was to deprive her, a single mother, of the ability to support her children . All judges, however can develop empathy. And in telling the story of Helen Palsgraf, Judge Noonan makes a good case for why they should." [86]

In 2011, Cardi analyzed the present-day influence that Palsgraf has had on state courts. He found that neither Cardozo nor Andrews has won on the question of how duty of care is formulated, with courts applying policy analyses. "As to the proper doctrinal home for plaintiff-foreseeability, Cardozo has undoubtedly prevailed. Although a clear majority of jurisdictions state that duty is the proper home for plaintiff-foreseeability, Cardozo's vision of foreseeability as a categorical determination has not been widely adopted." [87] But, he noted, "Andrews may have found a back door to victory. Arguably the most important consequence of the Palsgraf decision, the resolution of the judge/jury question, appears to lean in Andrews' direction. A majority of courts prefer to leave foreseeability—even as a part of duty—to the jury." [87]

Scheppele put Palsgraf in social context, noting that 108 passengers were killed in railroad operations on the LIRR in 1924, a typical figure for it in the 1920s.

Social scientists of a more qualitative and historical bent would see the Palsgraf case as part of a long history in which the railroad industry imposed substantial costs on the broader society, costs that were never added to the ledgers of the railroads. Most train accidents were not litigated. Those that were shared the fate of Mrs. Palsgraf's: each case was taken on its own facts as an isolated, freak occurrence, and the broader consequence, in which death and injury became a normal byproduct of running the railroad, was disregarded. If judges could see—if not through statistics, then perhaps through the social history of the railroad industry—just how dangerous trains were and how much death and destruction they left in their path, they may have been less inclined to think that Mrs. Palsgraf's problem was that those two men carried fireworks onto the platform that day. [88]


§ 1983 Civil Rights Claims Follow Local Rules on Statutes of Limitations

For § 1983 lawsuits, the courts will apply the statute of limitations applicable to similar actions in the subject locale. In other words, for personal injury and wrongful death claims in New Mexico, the SOL will follow the local New Mexico rules. Thus, the statute of limitations for personal injury and wrongful death will apply as these are the most similar in nature to § 1983 claims.

The confusion arises because § 1983 civil rights claims are almost invariably filed against governmental entities, such as prisons which is where Collins & Collins, P.C. focuses much of its work. So the question arises as to which New Mexico statute of limitations on personal injury and wrongful death claims should apply in case of § 1983 civil rights claims, the general personal injury SOL or the SOL for suits against the government?

Fortunately, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals which governs New Mexico federal district court has ruled alleviating the confusion.


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